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At the federal level, homeland security is inherently and fundamentally an interagency 
undertaking. The quality of interagency relationships and processes is central to the 
success or failure of federal – and national – homeland security activities. Short of 
giving a single Cabinet secretary directive authority over other Cabinet secretaries 
during major domestic incidents (which is unlikely given traditional forms of American 
government) the only way to ensure effective unity of effort at the federal level is to 
exercise strong leadership from the White House. This kind of leadership is needed not 
just during an actual catastrophe but also when the government is engaged in the day-
to-day activities of working to prevent, protect against, and prepare for such 
catastrophes. In recent years the White House has not played this role, in large part 
because of the bifurcation of national security issues into a National Security Council 
and a Homeland Security Council. One of the most important and most necessary 
changes the new administration should make is to merge these organizations into a 
single council with a largely shared professional staff. This newly merged Council should 
exercise forceful leadership on behalf of the president of the United States in developing 
homeland security strategy and policy and should closely oversee its implementation.  
Why a Merger is Needed 
There are three main reasons that the existing Homeland Security Council (HSC) and its 
staff have not been particularly effective. The first, and perhaps most important, is 
structural: by establishing a separate council and associated staff to address homeland 
issues, the White House artificially bifurcated its approach to national security issues, 
although the issues themselves frequently have both domestic and international aspects 
that are interrelated. For example, effectively combating terrorism involves targeting 
terrorists and their support networks overseas, but also addressing the potential for 
radicalization of individuals inside the United States.  Effectively addressing 21st century 
security challenges requires an integrated approach that considers both sides of a given 
problem – but such an approach is very difficult to achieve when two different 
organizations inside the White House are involved. Both council staffs work in the Old 
Executive Office Building, but they share little more than a mailing address. Each 
council has a different organizational structure, each staff reports to a different adviser 
to the president, and each has its own executive secretariat, with separate systems for 
convening meetings and designating lead directorates on specific issues. The two council 
staffs don’t even work on the same e-mail system: while the NSC staff does most of its 
work on the classified e-mail system, the HSC staff works mostly on the “low side,” or 
the unclassified network. Some coordination between the two staffs does take place, but 
it occurs largely through the initiative of individual staff members, who must overcome 
the hurdles presented by the bifurcated structure. 
A second major reason for the ineffectiveness of the HSC on many issues is 
organizational: it is relatively weak, particularly compared to the NSC. A host of dry, 
technical personnel and budget issues have contributed significantly to this problem. 
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Unlike the NSC and its staff, the HSC and its staff do not constitute a separate 
organization inside the Executive Office of the President; as a result, HSC personnel 
numbers count against the overall personnel ceiling for White House staff and so there 
is pressure to minimize the size of the HSC organization. While the NSC has more than 
240 staff members, the HSC on average has only forty-five.1 Moreover, as a consequence 
of HSC’s administrative status within the Office of the President, the council does not 
have its own budget, which places a tight salary cap on the staff. Although HSC staff 
members have significant responsibility and work extremely long hours, even the 
highest paid among them earn less than senior GS-15 civil servants elsewhere in 
government. This salary gap has added to the difficulty of recruiting the best and 
brightest to the HSC organization – a task that was already challenging, because the 
HSC is seen as having less stature than the NSC. As a result, many more HSC than NSC 
staffers have backgrounds in political campaigns rather than in national and homeland 
security issues, and frequently they are less experienced overall than their NSC peers. 
Finally, the HSC has not been particularly effective in its efforts either to lead the 
interagency in developing core strategy and guidance on homeland security issues (such 
as developing an interagency deliberate planning process) or in overseeing 
implementation of policies once they are developed (such as the range of documents and 
processes called for in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 on National 
Preparedness that was signed out in 2004).  This lack of success can be partly attributed 
to the HSC’s relatively small and inexperienced staff, but it is also associated with the 
explicit preference shown by the Bush Administration for “the lead agency approach,” 
which focuses the NSC and HSC staffs primarily on coordination rather than 
development of strategy and policy.2 Historically, some presidents have structured the 
NSC to take a greater leadership role in driving foreign and national security policy; 
others have used the NSC primarily as a coordinating body.3 However, as security 
challenges become increasingly complex, and as extensive capabilities must be 
integrated from across the entire federal government, the lead agency model clearly will 
prove inadequate in many cases. During the Bush Administration, the Department of 
Homeland Security has served as the lead agency for most major homeland security 
initiatives, but in the absence of firm backing from the White House and an HSC with 
the power to quash bureaucratic disagreements, DHS has typically expended a great 
deal of its efforts on intramural struggles within the executive branch.4   
What a Merged Council Would Look Like 
Merging the two councils is the first step the new administration can take toward 
creating significantly more unity of effort in government efforts to prevent, prepare for, 
and respond to a catastrophe. A newly unified NSC and staff should be empowered to 
lead the interagency in formulating homeland security policy and overseeing its 
implementation on behalf of the president of the United States. To effect this merger, 
President Obama will need to ask Congress to amend the Homeland Security Act of 
2002 by eliminating sections 901 through 906 of the law, which essentially establish the 
Homeland Security Council as a distinct organization.5 Unifying the Homeland Security 
Council and National Security Council organizations would also require amending the 
National Security Act of 1947 to make the secretary of homeland security and attorney 
general permanent members of the NSC. The current practice of inviting other Cabinet 
 3 
heads to NSC meetings as appropriate to the specific substantive issues under 
consideration should continue. 
The unified National Security Council would be led by the national security adviser 
(NSA) to the president, as is the case today, but the NSA would have two deputies – a 
deputy for international affairs and a deputy for domestic affairs. The national security 
adviser already holds one of the most grueling jobs in Washington, bearing the 
responsibility for a vast array of issues. Merging the two councils and their staffs would 
clearly add to this burden, but that disadvantage is more than outweighed by the 
benefits of addressing security issues holistically at the White House level. Assigning all 
security issues to a single national security adviser will ensure that the NSA has 
sufficient authority to resolve conflicts between Cabinet heads, particularly during times 
of crisis. Moreover, the two deputies would help lessen the challenge for the NSA of 
dealing with such a broad span of duties. These deputies would also need to be of 
sufficient stature to work effectively with top government officials, up to and including 
the level of Cabinet secretaries. During the Bush administration there have been as 
many as five positions labeled “deputy NSA” at one time; limiting their number to two 
would give the office more importance, bringing its holders much closer to being true 
seconds-in-command to the NSA. Moreover, should the international and domestic 
aspects of a problem seem to give rise to conflicting solutions or to require trade-offs, a 
single national security adviser with authority over the entire spectrum of issues will be 
positioned to weigh all elements and make a balanced recommendation to the president. 
Under the current model, the president has no single adviser whose job it is to weigh the 
competing domestic and international aspects of a problem and render an impartial 
judgment – overcoming the disagreements of Cabinet members, if necessary.  
Under the merged council construct, with a single NSA and two deputy NSAs, much 
of the NSC staff would be shared and would report to both deputies. Some staffers might 
report only to one deputy, depending on their responsibilities. While President Obama 
should merge the two councils and their staffs, care should be taken to ensure that the 
“new” NSC organization complements its traditional national security expertise with 
senior staff who fully understand and possess considerable experience in catastrophe 
prevention, critical infrastructure protection, preparedness, response, and recovery 
issues. A merged council that is staffed only with traditional national security experts 
will not be effective at developing homeland security policy and guidance and would 
largely defeat the purpose of the merger. 
Not only should the merged council include significant staff with expertise in 
homeland security disciplines, the council also should include staff that provide state 
and local government perspectives to ensure greater integration of these issues at the 
federal level. The National Security Education Program codified in Executive Order 
13434 provides a mechanism to bring individuals with these backgrounds on to the 
merged council staff. Through the National Security Professional Development 
Program, senior state and local officials could join the council staff for a year to serve a 
detail assignment at the NSC. Under this type of program, senior people serving in the 
counterterrorism division of the New York City Police Department could spend a year at 
the White House, working in the merged council. This type of a rotational approach 
would also create opportunities for professionals at the federal level to serve in key 
positions in state and local governments, enabling them to use those experiences to 
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inform their work when they return to the federal government. Although achieving these 
kinds of opportunities presents a host of bureaucratic challenges, their achievement 
would be a major step toward creating a truly “joint” homeland security workforce with 
vertical and horizontal integration that would enhance national preparedness. 
In addition to integrating state and local perspectives at the staff level, there are other 
means of infusing these perspectives into policy-making at the White House level. The 
next president could reinstate the Homeland Security Advisory Council established to 
provide advice and counsel to the Executive Office of the President. Re-establishing this 
council would be another way to craft sensible homeland security policies and create 
greater buy-in for these policies outside the Beltway. To avoid charges of drawing only 
on the “usual suspects” at the state and local level for input, the next president should 
allow organizations like the National Governors Association (NGA), the U.S. Conference 
of Mayors, and the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) to choose 
some of the members of the advisory council. Creating  new opportunities for state and 
local representatives to provide input into policy development at the federal level geared 
toward implementing a national integrated homeland security system would not only 
help to increase the feeling of ownership of new policies, but would also generate better 
understanding at the federal level of how homeland security needs vary by state and 
region. 
What a Merged Council Would Do 
Whatever the specific organization chosen by President Obama, to generate greater 
unity of effort the new unified National Security Council must play a much more 
prominent role in developing strategy and policy, and in overseeing the implementation 
of that policy, than either the NSC or HSC has done under the current administration. 
As integrated approaches to address future security challenges are developed, the roles 
of all relevant Cabinet agencies will not be equal. Some strategies may require that 
departments take responsibilities that are outside their traditional comfort zones; some 
resources may have to be shifted from one department to another. To ensure that clear 
policies are developed, difficult decisions are made, and turf battles are decisively 
resolved, a robust and unified NSC must act as honest broker and be empowered to 
carry out presidential decisions once they are made. 
Some have argued that a merger is not particularly necessary, because the existence 
of separate Homeland Security and National Security Councils has not led to any major 
policy failures. The existence of two separate councils may not have caused any major 
policy failures, but it has caused the executive branch to miss important opportunities to 
develop more effective homeland security policy. For example, if the National Response 
Framework outlines how the federal government will operate with its partners “to the 
right of the boom,” there is no analogue to how the federal government will operate with 
its partners “to the left of the boom” – before a catastrophe takes place. There are many 
reasons the executive branch does not yet have a National Prevention Framework, but in 
part it is because developing a prevention framework would have required staffs from 
the NSC and HSC – who come from different professional disciplines and cultures – to 
work together closely, solmething they are not used to doing. Merging these staffs into a 
single organization would bring them together and begin building a corporate culture of 
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cross-fertilization and integration during policy development, which is sorely needed in 
the broader homeland security enterprise 
Just as important as effective NSC leadership during the front-end phase policy 
development is attentive NSC oversight of policy implementation. Such oversight does 
not imply an operational role for the council and its staff; the pitfalls of an operational 
NSC were amply demonstrated by the activities of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North and 
others on the NSC staff during the Reagan administration. But in light of the relative 
autonomy of the Cabinet agencies, and the frequency of hard-fought battles over policies 
and resources, the only way to guarantee effective implementation is for the NSC staff to 
closely monitor the activities of Cabinet agencies. The current HSC organization does 
not have the staff, expertise, or stature to perform such monitoring; the current NSC has 
the necessary assets but lacks the power (which must be granted by the president) to 
execute this oversight role. As a result, turf battles are fought and re-fought, policy 
initiatives languish, congressional reporting deadlines are missed, and bureaucratic 
logrolling is common. 
When a Merger Should Happen 
Although considerable progress has been made since the September 11 attacks in 2001, 
the country is still not fully prepared to deal with a domestic catastrophe. What 
ultimately matters to the American public is not how far we have come, but how far 
away we still are from being prepared for the next catastrophe. Homeland security 
received scant attention during the 2008 presidential campaign, but the task of readying 
the United States to face the threats of the post-September 11 era is an enormous one 
and poses a fundamental challenge for the new president. A merged NSC-HSC would go 
a long way towards enabling the federal government to do its part to better prepare the 
United States to face future challenges. Merging the HSC and the NSC would send a 
clear signal that homeland security issues will now be a fundamental part of President 
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